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A growing literature stresses the importance of reciprocity, especially for employment
relations. In this paper, we study the interaction of diﬀerent payment modes with
reciprocity. In particular, we analyze how equal wages aﬀect performance and eﬃciency
in an environment characterized by contractual incompleteness. In our experiment, one
principal is matched with two agents. The principal pays equal wages in one treatment
and can set individual wages in the other. We ﬁnd that the use of equal wages elicits
substantially lower eﬀorts and eﬃciency. This is not caused by monetary incentives
per se since under both wage schemes it is proﬁt-maximizing for agents to exert high
eﬀorts. The treatment diﬀerence is rather driven by the fact that reciprocity is violated
far more frequently in the equal wage treatment. Agents suﬀering from a violation of
reciprocity subsequently withdraw eﬀort. Our results suggest that individual reward
and punishment opportunities are crucial for making reciprocity a powerful contract
enforcement device.
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“To treat people fairly you have to treat people diﬀerently.”
Roy Roberts, at that time VP of General Motors1
1 Introduction
In recent years, a vast body of literature has stressed the inﬂuence of social norms
on individual decision making processes. Especially reciprocity, i.e., the willingness
to reward kind actions and punish unkind actions even at a cost, has proven to be a
highly relevant norm (e.g., Fehr and G¨ achter 1998, Fehr and G¨ achter 2000, Fehr and
Schmidt 2003). In employment relations, reciprocity can mitigate the enforcement
problems of incomplete contracts: many agents repay a gift in the form of higher wages
by providing higher eﬀorts even in one-shot situations where no future gains can be
expected (e.g., Fehr et al. 1997, Hannan et al. 2002, Fehr and Falk 2002 Maximiano
et al. forthcoming). This “gift exchange” (Akerlof 1982) constitutes at least a partial
solution to moral-hazard problems that are widespread in labor relations.
The potential of reciprocity as a contract enforcement device, however, is likely to
depend on the institutions that shape the employment relation, above all the mode of
payment. Yet little is known about the interaction of reciprocity with diﬀerent pay-
ment modes. Exploring this interaction is crucial in order to understand under which
pay scheme the eﬃciency-enhancing eﬀects of reciprocity develop their full power. This
is what this paper does. The speciﬁc wage institution we study is wage equality. In
particular we address the following questions: Is wage equality an eﬃcient payment
scheme when contract enforcement relies on reciprocity? Do principals choose to pay
equal wages if they are not constrained to? How does the mode of payment aﬀect
work morale? Are equal wages perceived as fairer compared to individual wages?
Paying equal wages to workers on the same level of a hierarchy is common practice
in many ﬁrms (e.g., Medoﬀ and Abraham 1980, Baker et al. 1988). Several reasons
for equal wages have been brought forward, amongst them increased peer monitoring
(Knez and Simester 2001) and lower transaction costs since contracts do not have to
be negotiated with every worker individually (see also Prendergast 1999). In addition,
a concern for fairness has been a main argument invoked to justify equal wages. It
has been argued that diﬀerential pay of co-workers is considered unfair by workers,
causes resentment and envy within the workforce, and ultimately lower performance
(Akerlof and Yellen 1990, Bewley 1999, Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Equality is also
often referred to in employer-union bargaining as being a cornerstone of a fair wage
scheme.
We contribute to the discussion about equal wages by examining their impact on the
eﬀectiveness of reciprocity in enforcing incomplete contracts. Paying equal wages for
1Quoted in Baker et al. (1988).1 Introduction 2
equal performance seems uncontroversial in this respect. But in real-life work relations
this case is likely to be the exception rather than the rule. When workers diﬀer in
their performance the following questions need to be answered. Does reciprocity imply
that the agent who works more should also get a higher payoﬀ compared to his co-
worker? In other words, does the often-heard slogan “equal pay for equal work” also
call for “unequal pay for unequal work”? If this is the case, does a high-performing
agent become frustrated and decrease work eﬀort under equal wages?2 How do low-
performing agents react? What are the consequences for eﬃciency?
Ideally, these questions would be examined in two work environments that diﬀer only
with respect to the payment mode. To come close to this ideal world, we introduce a
simple and parsimonious laboratory experiment that allows us to analyze the interac-
tion between the institution of wage equality and reciprocity. In the experiment, one
principal is matched with two agents. In a ﬁrst stage the agents exert costly eﬀort.
After observing their eﬀorts, the principal pays them a wage. In the main treatment
he can choose the level of the wage but he is obliged to pay the same wage to both
agents (equal wage treatment or EWT). In the control treatment, the principal can
wage discriminate between the two agents (individual wage treatment or IWT). In
both treatments, neither eﬀorts nor wages are contractible. Note that principals in
the individual wage treatment are free to pay the same wage to both agents, i.e., the
EWT is a special case of the IWT.
The main ﬁndings of the experiment are as follows. First, performance diﬀers sub-
stantially between the EWT and the IWT: agents who are paid equal wages exert
signiﬁcantly lower eﬀorts than agents who are paid individually. Eﬀort levels are
nearly twice as high under individual wages. In addition, eﬀorts decline over time
when equal wages are paid. Second, this strong treatment eﬀect cannot be explained
by diﬀerences in monetary incentives. The actual wage choices of principals imply
that providing high eﬀort levels is proﬁtable for agents in both treatments. From a
purely monetary viewpoint agents’ behavior in both treatments should thus be similar.
Third, we show that the frequent violation of the norm of reciprocity in the equal wage
treatment can explain the eﬀort diﬀerences between the treatments. In both treat-
ments, agents who exert a higher eﬀort and earn a lower payoﬀ than their co-worker
strongly decrease their eﬀort in the next period. This pattern is very similar in both
treatments. However, the norm of reciprocity is violated much more frequently under
equal wages. Principals in the IWT understand the mechanisms of reciprocity quite
well. When eﬀorts diﬀer they do pay diﬀerent wages, rewarding the harder-working
2Lazear (1989) raises similar doubts about pay equality (p. 561): “It is common for both manage-
ment and worker groups such as labor unions to express a desire for homogeneous wage treatment.
The desire for similar treatment is frequently articulated as an attempt to preserve worker unity, to
maintain good morale, and to create a cooperative work environment. But it is far from obvious that
pay equality has these eﬀects.”1 Introduction 3
agent with a higher payoﬀ in most cases.
Agents’ reactions cause completely diﬀerent dynamics in the two treatments. Under
equal wages, initially hard-working agents get discouraged and reduce their eﬀort to the
level of their low-performing co-workers. By contrast, in the individual wage treatment
the high performers keep exerting high eﬀorts while the low performers change their
behavior and strongly increase their eﬀort levels.
Our results suggest a psychological rationale for using individual wages. Subjects
perceive equal wages for unequal performance as unfair and reduce their eﬀort subse-
quently. The traditional literature on incentive provision in groups comes to a similar
conclusion though for a diﬀerent reason. It is usually argued that the ineﬃciency of
equal wages stems from the fact that marginal products and wages are not aligned.
This can lead to free-riding among selﬁsh agents (e.g., Holmstr¨ om 1982, Erev et al.
1993). We enlarge the scope of this critical view on wage equality: interestingly, in
our setup it is precisely the presence of reciprocal agents and not their absence that
calls for the use of individual rewards.
Since agents in our experiment compare their payoﬀ with the payoﬀ of their co-worker,
our results also inform the literature analyzing the inﬂuence of relative income on
satisfaction and performance. It has been shown that relative income aﬀects people’s
well-being (e.g., Clark and Oswald 1996, Easterlin 2001). However, it is less clear
how this inﬂuences performance, i.e., whether low relative income leads to frustration
and reduced performance (as in Clark et al. 2006 and Torgler et al. 2006) or to an
increase in performance due to a “positional arms race” (Neumark and Postlewaite
1998, Layard 2005, Bowles and Park 2005). The controlled laboratory environment of
our experiment allows us to reconcile these diﬀering views. Our results indicate that
the comparison process goes beyond a one-dimensional comparison of income and also
includes a comparison of eﬀort. In particular, they suggest that receiving a lower
income while exerting a higher eﬀort leads to reduced performance which is likely to
be driven by feelings of exploitation. By contrast, a lower income that is generated by
a lower eﬀort leads to a (small) increase in performance.
There are only a few experimental studies that analyze the interaction of payment
modes and social preferences when contracts are incomplete.3 Fehr et al. (forthcom-
ing) let principals choose between contracts relying on explicit incentives and “bonus
contracts” relying on trust and reciprocity. In a bilateral setup, they ﬁnd that a bonus
contract oftentimes yields a higher eﬃciency than the incentive contract. Most closely
related to our paper is the work of Charness and Kuhn (2005). Here, one principal is
3Theoretical analyses of this interaction are provided by, for example, Demougin and Fluet (2003),
Bartling and von Siemens (2004a, 2004b), and Itoh (2004). All these models rely on purely distributive
(outcome-based) preferences like envy or inequality aversion. For most cases they do not predict that
equal wages do lead to lower eﬀort exertion as it is the case in our experiment.2 Experimental Setup 4
matched with two agents diﬀering in productivity; like in our study, wages and eﬀorts
are not contractible. In contrast to our results, they ﬁnd that co-workers’ wages do not
matter much for agents’ decisions. However, their design diﬀers from ours in several
important points. While Charness and Kuhn focus on heterogeneity in productivity,
we look at the eﬀect of actual output diﬀerences between agents. Furthermore, we
allow for richer comparisons between the agents, as in their design agents are not
aware of the magnitude and direction of the productivity diﬀerences. The diﬀerent
results underline the importance of information for determining the reference group:
Charness and Kuhn’s results rather apply to groups of workers that are loosely related
and know little about each other, while our focus is on close co-workers who have a
good understanding about their peers’ abilities and eﬀorts.
Regarding compensation practice in ﬁrms, our ﬁndings highlight the importance of
taking the concerns for co-workers’ wages into account. However, doing so by paying
equal wages to a group of agents may actually do more harm than good. As soon as
agents diﬀer in their performance, equal wages which seem to be a fair institution at
ﬁrst sight might be considered very unfair. While the discouraging eﬀect of equal wages
on hard-working agents has long been informally discussed (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts
1992) this paper provides controlled evidence in favor of this intuition. Moreover, it
suggests that it is the violation of reciprocity that causes the discouragement and
low performance. Our results should not be interpreted as arguments against wage
equality in general but they rather point to limits of equal wages. Wage equality
is potentially a good choice in occupations where, e.g., due to technological reasons,
workers’ performance diﬀers only slightly or where performance diﬀerences are due
to random inﬂuences. In addition, the transparency of co-workers’ work eﬀorts and
wages might have an inﬂuence on the optimal choice of the pay scheme.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section we describe
the experimental design and discuss theoretical predictions. In section 3 we present
and discuss results and section 4 concludes.
2 Experimental Setup
2.1 Experimental Design
In the experiment, one principal is matched with two agents. The subjects play a two-
stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, the agents decide simultaneously and independently
how much eﬀort they want to exert. Exerting eﬀort is costly for the agents. Eﬀort
choices range from 1 to 10 and are associated with a convex cost function displayed in
Table 1. The principal reaps the beneﬁts of production: every unit of eﬀort increases
his payoﬀ by 10.2 Experimental Setup 5
Eﬀort level ei 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cost of eﬀort c(ei) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 13 16 20
Table 1: Cost of eﬀort.
In the second stage, after observing the eﬀort decisions of the agents in his group,
the principal decides on wages for the two agents. The wages have to be between 0
and 100. Neither eﬀorts nor wages are contractible. The only diﬀerence between the
treatments is the mode of payment. In our main treatment the principal can only
choose one wage w that is paid to each of the agents (equal wage treatment or EWT).
In the control treatment he can discriminate between the two agents by choosing wages
w1 and w2 for agent 1 and 2, respectively (individual wage treatment or IWT). The
EWT is thus a special case of the IWT. At the end of each period, the two agents
and the principal are informed about eﬀorts, wage(s), and the resulting payoﬀs for all
three players. The payoﬀ functions for the players are summarized in Table 2.
Treatment EWT IWT
Payoﬀ Principal πP = 10(e1 + e2) − 2w πP = 10(e1 + e2) − (w1 + w2)
Payoﬀ Agent i πAi = w − c(ei) πAi = wi − c(ei)
Table 2: Payoﬀs of players.
This game is played for twelve periods. We implemented a stranger design to abstract
from confounding reputation eﬀects, i.e., at the beginning of each period principals
and agents were rematched anonymously and randomly within a matching group. A
matching group consisted of three principals and six agents. The subjects kept their
roles throughout the entire experiment. After the last period, subjects answered a
questionnaire. The experiment was conducted in a labor market framing, i.e., princi-
pals were called “employers” and agents were called “employees”.4
Our setup is related to the gift-exchange game (Fehr et al. 1993) but diﬀers in two
important ways. First, a principal is matched with two agents instead of one. This
is an essential prerequisite to analyze the interaction between the institution of wage
equality and reciprocity. Additionally, the agents move ﬁrst while in most experiments
the principal moves ﬁrst. Our move order allows the principal to base his wage decision
on the actually exerted eﬀort.5
4An English translation of the instructions is available from the authors upon request.
5For an experiment in which principals move ﬁrst and decide according to productivity diﬀerences,
see Charness and Kuhn (2005). See Gneezy (2006) for a direct comparison of move orders.2 Experimental Setup 6
All participants started the experiment with an initial endowment of 400 points that
also served as their show-up fee. Points earned were converted at an exchange rate of
0.01 Euro/point. The experiment was conducted at the BonnEconLab at the Univer-
sity of Bonn in April 2005 using z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999). For each treatment, we
ran four sessions with a total of 8 matching groups (144 participants). The experiment
lasted approximately 70 minutes. On average subjects earned 8.30 Euro including the
show-up fee of 4 Euro.
2.2 Behavioral Predictions
Eﬃciency is determined by agents’ eﬀort choices. It is maximized if both agents
exert the highest possible eﬀort of 10. However, if all players are rational and selﬁsh
the principal will not pay anything to the agents since wage payments only reduce
his monetary payoﬀ. Anticipating this, both agents will provide the minimal eﬀort
of one in the ﬁrst stage. The ﬁnite repetition of the game in randomly rematched
groups does not change this prediction. This subgame perfect equilibrium is the same
for both payment modes. If all players were selﬁsh we should therefore expect no
diﬀerence between treatments.
By contrast, in laboratory experiments studying labor relations with incomplete con-
tracts, one typically observes that eﬀorts and wages exceed the smallest possible value.
Moreover, wages and eﬀorts are positively correlated (e.g., Fehr and G¨ achter 2000).
These stylized facts can be explained with a preference for reciprocity, i.e., players
reward kind actions of other players and punish unkind actions, even if they have to
incur a cost for the reward or punishment. This implies that a higher eﬀort will be
rewarded with a higher wage. More importantly, the two treatments of our experi-
ment can yield diﬀerent outcomes if players are reciprocal. In our three-player setup,
reciprocity might imply that the agent who works more also should get a higher payoﬀ
compared to his co-worker.6 This is not possible under wage equality when agents
diﬀer in their performance. Since agents are paid the same wage and have to bear
the cost of eﬀort exertion, the agent who exerted a higher eﬀort receives a lower net
payoﬀ and feels exploited. Providing an additional unit of eﬀort increases the risk of
being exploited and therefore constitutes a disincentive to provide eﬀort for reciprocal
agents under equal wages.7
6Note that this concept of reciprocity does not solely rely on intentions of the principal but rather
captures procedural fairness more generally (cf. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004 or Falk and
Fischbacher 2006 for formal models of reciprocity).
7The co-worker of an exploited agent may also experience some disutility. He works less but earns
more than his colleague, so he could feel guilty about this undeserved proﬁt. However, it is reasonable
to assume that a disadvantageous norm violation (exploitation) is experienced more strongly than an
advantageous norm violation (guilt). Support for this assumption can be found in, e.g., Loewenstein
et al. (1989) and Babcock et al. (1996).3 Results 7
On the contrary, in the individual wage treatment it is always possible for a principal
to fulﬁll the norm of reciprocity. He can set the wages such that the hard-working
agent gets a higher payoﬀ. If principals mostly do so, one will observe fewer norm
violations in the IWT than in the EWT. If agents react similarly to norm violations
in both treatments, eﬀorts in the EWT should be lower than under individual wages.8
3 Results
In this section we present the results of the experiment and discuss possible explana-
tions for the observed behavior. We ﬁrst analyze the eﬃciency implications of the two
payment schemes by comparing the eﬀort choices of agents. We then explore possi-
ble reasons for the eﬀort choices by analyzing how the mode of pay aﬀects monetary
incentives and interacts with the social preferences of the agents.
3.1 Eﬀort Choices and Eﬃciency
Figure 1 shows the development of average eﬀorts over time. Two things are striking
about the graph. First, eﬀorts are considerably lower in the equal wage treatment.
While agents in the IWT on average exert an eﬀort of 8.21, agents in the EWT only
provide an eﬀort of 4.40 (Mann-Whitney test: p < 0.01).9 Second, eﬀorts decrease
over time under equal wages which is not the case when individual wages are paid
(Wilcoxon test for periods 1–6 against 7–12: IWT, p = 0.56; EWT, p < 0.01). This
means that the eﬀort diﬀerence under the two wage schemes becomes even larger during
the experiment. The treatment diﬀerence is also present when individual matching
groups are considered: the highest average eﬀort of an EWT matching group (5.88) is
still lower than the lowest average eﬀort of an IWT matching group (7.47).
The diﬀerence in agents’ behavior can also be seen in the histogram of eﬀort choices
(Figure 2). In the individual wage treatment agents choose the maximum eﬀort of 10
in 49% of the cases, 84% of the choices are higher than 6. Under equal wages, agents
choose an eﬀort higher than 6 in only 26% of all cases. The eﬀort decisions are more
spread out in the EWT, the minimal eﬀort of 1 being the modal choice with 24% of
the choices.
The comparison of eﬀort levels across treatments shows that the enforcement power
of reciprocity strongly depends on the wage scheme that is used. Under equal wages,
8Other models of social preferences assume that players do not care about reciprocity per se but
dislike unequal payoﬀs, e.g., the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Using their preferred parameters,
their model predicts the same outcome in our game as the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium: minimal
wages (w = 0) and minimal eﬀorts (e = 1). Assuming extreme values for the guilt parameter (β > 2/3
for 40% of subjects) does not change this result by much. In this case, the model predicts an average
eﬀort of 1.6. This prediction is the same for both treatments. Calculations are available upon request.





























Figure 1: Average eﬀort per period. The eﬀort is aggregated per period over all
matching groups.
eﬀorts are relatively low, reaching only about half the level of eﬀorts in the IWT. At
the same time, the individual wage institution is very successful in eliciting eﬀorts.
Although contracts are not enforceable at all, eﬀorts are close to the maximum in the
IWT. Since higher eﬀorts increase production and since the marginal product of eﬀort
always exceeds its marginal cost, the diﬀerences in eﬀort provision directly translate
into diﬀerences in eﬃciency.
Result 1: The two payment modes exhibit strong diﬀerences with respect to
the performance they elicit: agents who are paid equal wages exert signiﬁcantly
lower eﬀorts than agents who are paid individually. This results in a much
higher eﬃciency under individual wages.
Both, the agents and the principals beneﬁt from the increase in eﬃciency. The average
period proﬁt of a principal is 56 in the EWT compared to 100 in the IWT (Mann-
Whitney test: p < 0.01), while agents earn an average period proﬁt of 10 under equal
wages vs. 17 under individual wages (Mann-Whitney test: p < 0.01).10
3.2 Wage Setting and Monetary Incentives
In order to better understand the vast diﬀerences in eﬀort choices, we now take a closer
look at principals’ wage setting and the resulting monetary incentives for the agents
under the two payment schemes. Figure 3 plots the average wage per eﬀort level in the
10The large payoﬀ diﬀerence between principals and agents is (at least partly) driven by to the
two-to-one matching and the last-mover advantage of principals that has also been observed in other































Figure 2: Frequency of eﬀort choices.
two treatments. For both treatments we take the wage paid by the principal for each
individual eﬀort decision and calculate averages for a given eﬀort level.11 The graph
exhibits the upward sloping eﬀort-wage relation of many gift-exchange experiments.
For example, an agent in the equal wage treatment who exerts an eﬀort of 1 receives
on average a wage of 6.3 while an agent exerting an eﬀort of 10 receives an average
wage of 30.3. In the individual wage treatment, the corresponding wages are 1.7 and
39.5.
The eﬀort-wage relation indicates that principals are indeed reciprocal, i.e., they re-
ward higher eﬀort levels with higher wages. While this holds true in both treatments,
some diﬀerences between the treatments are worth noting. First, the wage increase is
somewhat steeper in the IWT. Moreover, the average wages in the EWT do not rise
as steadily as in the IWT but ﬂuctuate more strongly, especially for high eﬀort levels.
While this may partly be due to the low number of high eﬀort observations in the
EWT, it might also be caused by a stronger inﬂuence of the co-worker’s eﬀort ej on
worker i’s wage. We will turn to this point in more detail below.
Result 2: Principals reward a higher eﬀort with a higher wage in both treat-
ments.
The reciprocal behavior of the principals generates monetary incentives for agents.
The potential of reciprocity to enforce incomplete contracts partly depends on these
monetary incentives. Therefore, we will now explore the impact of the purely monetary
11Thus every wage decision of the principal enters twice in the equal wage treatment. In the IWT,
principals can set two wages, and each of these wages enters the analysis once. Principals in the IWT
do indeed use the possibility to set diﬀerent wages. If eﬀorts diﬀer they also pay diﬀerent wages in



























Figure 3: Average wage for a given eﬀort.
incentives on agents’ behavior, while bearing in mind that also non-monetary aspects
of the payment schemes will be important for the agents (see Section 3.3).
In order to derive the monetary incentives entailed in the principals’ wage decisions,
one ﬁrst has to take into account that the agents have to pay the cost of eﬀort exertion
(see Table 1). Qualitatively, this does not change the picture of the eﬀort-wage relation:
higher eﬀort levels seem to lead not only to higher wages, but also to higher proﬁts
for the agents. In order to check this in more detail, we estimate a simple linear
OLS-model where we regress the agent’s (period) proﬁt πAi on his eﬀort level ei and
a constant. To account for potential diﬀerences between the treatments we include
a treatment dummy IWT, and an interaction term of the treatment dummy and
agent’s eﬀort. IWT is equal to 1 for the individual wage treatment and equal to 0 for
the equal wage treatment. The estimation results are reported in column 1 of Table
3.12 The coeﬃcients indicate that the eﬀort-proﬁt relation is indeed positive in both
treatments. On average, an additional unit of eﬀort increases the agent’s proﬁt under
equal wages by 1.031 points. This coeﬃcient is weakly signiﬁcant. In the individual
wage treatment the eﬀort-proﬁt relation is slightly steeper: an eﬀort increase of 1 leads
to an increase in agent’s proﬁt of 1.804 points (1.031 + 0.773). The diﬀerence between
treatments, however, is not signiﬁcant.
We speculated above that exerting high eﬀort levels might be more risky for an agent
under equal wages since the co-worker’s eﬀort has probably a stronger inﬂuence on
the principal’s wage payment. An agent under individual pay only bears the risks of
12We allow for dependent observations within matching groups and assume that only observations
in diﬀerent matching groups are independent. The reported robust standard errors are adjusted for
this clustering.3 Results 11
Dep. Variable πAi πAi
ei 1.031* 0.854**
(0.535) (0.348)








IWT × ej -3.178***
(0.403)
N. Obs. 576 576
R2 0.100 0.238
Table 3: Proﬁt regressions. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. The
dummy “IWT” is equal to 1 for the individual wage treatment. Signiﬁcance at the
10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
contractual incompleteness, i.e., he risks meeting a principal who is not reciprocal and
pays no (or a low) wage. Under equal wages, the agent additionally faces the risk
of receiving a lower wage because his co-worker negatively inﬂuences the principal’s
wage decision. This might weaken the incentives to provide high eﬀorts, especially
for risk-averse agents. To check whether high eﬀort provision nevertheless pays oﬀ
individually, we estimate a second model where we control for the co-worker’s eﬀort
ej (see Column 2 of Table 3).13 The results indicate that indeed the co-worker’s eﬀort
choice has a substantial inﬂuence on an agent’s proﬁt under wage equality while it
has a negligible inﬂuence if individual wages are paid. An increase in agent j’s eﬀort
increases agent i’s proﬁt in a given period by 2.774 points in the EWT, while the
inﬂuence in the IWT is −0.404 (= 2.774 − 3.178).14 However, it is still individually
proﬁtable for the agents to exert high eﬀorts in the EWT. An additional unit of (own)
eﬀort increases the agent’s proﬁt by 0.854 points.
The regression analysis suggests that exerting higher eﬀorts is proﬁtable for the agents
under both wage schemes, at least if one averages over all observations in our sample.
13In order to estimate the inﬂuence of the co-worker’s eﬀort ej we have to split the sample such
that only one observation per ﬁrm is included in the analysis. In order to make the two speciﬁcations
comparable, we reported the ﬁrst regression for the same sample. The results do not depend on which
worker’s eﬀort is selected as “ei”.
14A separate regression for the IWT (not reported here) indicates that this value is not signiﬁcant








































Figure 4: Total proﬁts of agents given their average eﬀort level over all periods.
We now analyze whether this also holds if we aggregate eﬀorts and proﬁts individually
for each subject. In the scatter plot shown in Figure 4, the x-axis depicts the average
eﬀort of an agent that he exerted over the course of the 12 periods, the y-axis shows
the sum of all proﬁts of an agent. Each dot thus represents one subject. The picture
conﬁrms the previous impression: subjects who exerted a higher average eﬀort level
during the experiment earned higher proﬁts in total. More importantly, for the (few)
observations where agents provide similar average eﬀort levels in the two treatments
earnings are very similar, too. In light of this, the strong diﬀerences in actual eﬀorts
and especially the low eﬀort levels under equal wages are remarkable.
One could object that the subjects in the experiment did not have access to the
analyses we just presented. Both the regression analysis and the eﬀort-proﬁt relation
of Figure 4 are “ex-post” examinations while the subjects only observed the behavior
and outcomes of their previous groups. It could thus be that subjects were not able to
learn that high eﬀorts are proﬁtable given the limited information they had. To explore
if this is the case we calculate the proﬁt-maximizing eﬀort level for each agent in each
period based on the information this subject actually has. The agent is assumed to
choose the eﬀort level that was on average the most proﬁtable of all eﬀort levels he has
observed so far.15 The calculation shows that agents in the EWT could have increased
their eﬀorts and proﬁts considerably even by using only their limited information. In
the last period, the average proﬁt-maximizing eﬀort level exceeds the average actual
level in that period by 61%. By contrast, subjects in the IWT do ﬁnd the proﬁt-
15Since we assume that subjects do not “try” a never-observed eﬀort level and since some subjects
in the EWT never observe high eﬀort levels in their group, this calculation underestimates the optimal
eﬀort level for the EWT.3 Results 13
maximizing eﬀort levels: the average actual eﬀort levels in the IWT are very close to
the proﬁt-maximizing levels. Our ﬁndings concerning agents’ monetary incentives can
be summarized as follows.
Result 3: The wages paid by principals imply similar monetary incentives in
both treatments. A higher eﬀort leads to a higher proﬁt in both treatments.
The increase is only slightly stronger under individual wages.
While the analysis of the monetary incentives yielded some diﬀerences between the two
wage schemes at hand, these diﬀerences can hardly explain the discrepancy in agents’
performance reported above. Agents under individual wages provide very high eﬀort
levels, which is in line with the monetary incentives. On the other hand, agents under
equal wages predominantly choose low eﬀorts, thereby foregoing considerable proﬁts.
In light of these results, it is all the more important to analyze the non-monetary
incentives of the two wage schemes in detail.
3.3 Non-Monetary Incentives
In the preceding section we presented evidence that many principals reciprocate a
higher eﬀort with a higher wage in both treatments. As discussed in Section 2.2 this
is in line with the norm of reciprocity. However, reciprocal agents will additionally
care about whether the worker who works more than his co-worker also receives a
higher payoﬀ than his colleague. A violation of this second aspect of reciprocity has
diﬀerent implications for the two agents involved. First, an agent who works more
but does not receive a higher payoﬀ than his co-worker suﬀers twice: he feels unfairly
treated and he earns less. Thus, we refer to this situation as disadvantageous norm
violation. Analogously, his co-worker who exerts a lower eﬀort and earns a higher proﬁt
faces an advantageous norm violation since the unfairness is at least to his monetary
advantage.16 These norm violations cause non-monetary incentives that reinforce or
counteract the monetary incentives implied by the wage setting. The combination of
these two types of incentives will determine how agents perform under the respective
wage scheme.
3.3.1 Agents’ reactions to norm violations
In the following, we analyze how agents change their eﬀort provision after experiencing
an advantageous or a disadvantageous norm violation. We will show that a norm
violation leads to an overall decrease in eﬀort. This eﬀect is very similar in both
treatments, however, the norm of reciprocity is violated much more frequently in the
16More precisely, an advantageous norm violation comprises all cases when eﬀorts are equal but
payoﬀ is higher, or when eﬀort is lower eﬀort but payoﬀ is not. A disadvantageous norm violation
occurs if eﬀorts are equal but proﬁt is lower, or if eﬀort is higher but proﬁt is not.3 Results 14
Eﬀort Down Eﬀort Constant Eﬀort Up N. Obs.
EWT
No Violation 19.1 % 54.4 % 26.5 % 68
Adv. Violation 12.2 % 43.5 % 44.3 % 230
Disadv. Violation 52.6 % 33.9 % 13.5 % 230
Total 30.7 % 40.7 % 28.6 % 528
IWT
No Violation 19.2 % 51.8 % 29.0 % 448
Adv. Violation 45.0 % 27.5 % 27.5 % 40
Disadv. Violation 35.0 % 57.5 % 7.5 % 40
Total 22.3 % 50.4 % 27.3 % 528
Table 4: Frequency of eﬀort reactions.
EWT.
Table 4 shows how often agents decrease, increase or do not change their eﬀort from
period t to t + 1 after they experienced no, an advantageous or a disadvantageous
norm violation in period t. The top panel of Table 4 reports data for the equal wage
treatment. When the norm is fulﬁlled, most agents keep their eﬀort constant (54%)
and slightly more agents increase their eﬀort than decrease it. After experiencing an
advantageous violation of reciprocity, agents tend to increase their eﬀort (44%) and
only few reduce it (12%). The opposite is true after a disadvantageous norm violation:
the majority of agents decrease their eﬀort (53%) and only few increase their eﬀort in
the following period (14%). These numbers suggest that agents dislike being exploited
(disadvantageous norm violation) and dislike feeling guilty (advantageous norm viola-
tion). After a norm violation they change their eﬀort provision in the direction that
makes a violation less likely to occur in the next period. This is consistent with the
predictions of reciprocity.17
Behavior in the individual wage treatment (bottom panel) is very similar to behavior in
the EWT for the cases of no violation and disadvantageous violations. When the norm
is not violated agents mostly keep their eﬀort unchanged. After a disadvantageous
norm violation eﬀorts are decreased rather than increased, as in the EWT. The only
diﬀerence between the treatments is observed when agents experience an advantageous
norm violation: agents in the IWT tend to decrease their eﬀort while the EWT agents
tend to increase it in this case.
17Similar eﬀects are observed by Th¨ oni and G¨ achter (2005) in a related set-up. They allow agents
to revise their eﬀort decision after learning their co-workers’ eﬀort choice. In the revision stage, the
majority of agents decreases the eﬀort diﬀerence to their co-worker, i.e. agents with initially higher
eﬀort revise their decision downwards while agents with lower eﬀort revise it upwards.3 Results 15
If behavior is so similar between treatments, how can a preference for reciprocity
cause the treatment eﬀect? The last column of Table 4 shows how often the three
situations occur in the two treatments. In the EWT, the norm is violated in 87% of
all cases (460 out of 528) since this happens whenever agents exert diﬀerent eﬀorts.
By contrast, in the IWT reciprocity is violated only in 15% of the cases (80 out of
528). Thus, even if the behavior in a given situation is similar, agents in the EWT
are far more often exposed to norm violations than agents in the IWT. This is not
caused by the principals per se. It is rather the heterogeneity in eﬀorts combined with
the equal wage institution that forces principals to set wages that are not in line with
reciprocity. Principals in the IWT seem to understand the mechanisms of reciprocity
quite well and use the possibility to set diﬀerent wages in a sophisticated way. If eﬀorts
diﬀer they also pay diﬀerent wages in 91.4% of the cases, the more hard-working agent
getting the higher wage in 98.8% of these cases. Additionally they do not treat agents
diﬀerently if they exert the same eﬀort: if eﬀorts are equal, principals also pay equal
wages in 90.1% of the cases.18
Result 4: Agents mostly react to disadvantageous violations of reciprocity by
reducing their eﬀort and by increasing it after an advantageous norm violation.
The norm of reciprocity is far more often violated in the equal wage treatment.
So far we have seen that agents’ reactions are largely in line with the hypothesized
behavior of a reciprocal agent and that treatments diﬀer with respect to the frequency
of norm violations. Yet, this is not suﬃcient to explain the treatment eﬀect, since a
norm violation is always advantageous to the one agent and at the same time disad-
vantageous to the other one. If both agents adjust their eﬀort in a similar way but in
opposite directions the adjustments will cancel out. Reciprocity can only explain the
downward trend in eﬀort provision in the EWT if the reaction to a disadvantageous
norm violation is stronger than the reaction to an advantageous one.
We therefore analyze the magnitude of agents’ reactions to norm violations. Figure 5
shows the average change in eﬀort provision from period t to t + 1 after an agent
experienced no norm violation, a disadvantageous or an advantageous norm violation
in period t. The width of the bars corresponds to the number of observations in
18We checked the robustness of the reaction patterns in several ways. For example, it could be
possible that the results are driven by strong dynamics at the beginning of the experiment or by an
end-game eﬀect. The results stay however very similar if one restricts the analysis to the ﬁrst or the
second half of all periods. It could also be that agents react diﬀerently to norm violations if they are
paid very high or low wages. However, performing the analysis only for agents receiving a wage out
of the top or bottom quartile of the ex-post wage distribution does not alter the result. An implicit
assumption of our analysis is that the gift-exchange relation is generally intact between principal and
agent, i.e., that agents exert a non-minimal eﬀort and that principals pay a positive wage. The results
do not change if one restricts the analysis to these cases. Also if one deﬁnes gift exchange as requiring



































Figure 5: Magnitude of eﬀort reactions. The average change in eﬀort from period
t to period t + 1 is shown given that the agent experienced no norm violation, an
advantageous violation or a disadvantageous norm violation in period t. The width of
the bars corresponds to the number of observations.
the respective category (cf. last column of Table 4). After a disadvantageous norm
violation, agents in the EWT react strongly. They decrease their eﬀort by 1.30. Their
co-worker, experiencing an advantageous norm violation, increases his eﬀort but not as
strong. He raises his eﬀort by only 0.75.19 The direction of eﬀort change is in line with
the frequencies presented in Table 4. This analysis indicates that agents suﬀer more
from a disadvantageous norm violation than from an advantageous violation. Thus
the combination of a disadvantageous and an advantageous norm violation translates
into non-monetary incentives that lead to an overall decrease in eﬀorts.
As already observed above, in the IWT both groups of agents experiencing a norm
violation decrease their eﬀort. When reciprocity is not violated agents tend to keep
their eﬀort constant or even slightly increase it. We performed the same robustness
checks as for the analysis of Table 4. All the alternative speciﬁcations yield results
similar to the baseline speciﬁcation depicted in Figure 5.
Result 5: Agents’ reactions to a violation of reciprocity are asymmetric: the
negative reaction of the disadvantaged agents is stronger than the positive re-
action of the advantaged agents. This asymmetry in agents’ reactions results
in an overall negative time trend in eﬀorts for the EWT and in the strong
treatment diﬀerence in eﬀort.
The equal wage treatment leads to frequent norm violations. Agents experience the
equal wage scheme as less fair.20 Interestingly, even the principals consider the equal
19The diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon test of the absolute values: p = 0.01).
20Note that the treatment eﬀect cannot be explained by proﬁt inequalities per se. The absolute3 Results 17
wage scheme as less fair. In the post-experimental questionnaire, principals are pre-
sented three hypothetical game situations that include eﬀort choices, wage choices,
and the resulting payoﬀs for all players. They are asked whether they consider the
resulting allocation as just. One of the three situations reﬂects their own average
behavior in the experiment.21 The principals do not know that they are facing their
own past decisions when answering this question. 63% of the principals in the IWT
consider their own decisions fair while only 38% of the principals in the EWT share
this view (Mann-Whitney test on matching group shares: p = 0.03).
Summarizing, one can say that non-monetary incentives diﬀer between the treatments.
The equal wage institution forces the principals to violate reciprocity every time eﬀorts
are diﬀerent. These norm violations translate into non-monetary incentives, partly
overpowering monetary incentives and causing adverse reactions by the agents. The
asymmetry in the strength of reactions to a norm violation, especially the strong
negative reaction to a disadvantageous one, is then able to explain the overall negative
eﬀort trend and ultimately the low eﬀort levels in the EWT. By contrast, in the
individual wage treatment agents perform well since they are content with the fair
treatment: the more hard-working agent earns almost always more than his co-worker.
Principals use reciprocity forcefully as an incentive device, inducing high performance
of agents. Thus, all parties gain in monetary and non-monetary terms. The individual
wage scheme is not only more proﬁtable but also experienced as fairer.
3.3.2 Simulation with reciprocal agents
We have seen so far that the presence of reciprocal agents in combination with the
frequent violations of reciprocity in the EWT are able to explain the treatment dif-
ference. In order to further illustrate how institutions and reciprocity interact, we
take our previous ﬁndings on agents’ period-to-period reactions and link them to the
aggregate dynamics in the experiment. We do so by simulating agents’ behavior with
a simple “reciprocity adjustment” rule. In this simulation, all agents are assumed to
derive utility from money, but to also suﬀer from violations of a norm of reciprocity.
When deciding about their eﬀort in a given period, the simulated agents therefore
compare their eﬀort and proﬁt in the previous period with the eﬀort and proﬁt of
their co-worker in that period. According to the comparison along these two dimen-
diﬀerences between co-workers’ payoﬀs are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between treatments (IWT: 6.47,
EWT: 7.14, Mann-Whitney test: p = 0.29) but the sign diﬀers: in the IWT, the harder working agent
earns more, while the opposite is true in the EWT. Apparently, diﬀerent proﬁts are not considered
as unfair as long as the hard-working agent gets the higher payoﬀ.
21This situation was constructed as follows: We calculated the average eﬀort of the higher-eﬀort and
of the lower-eﬀort providers that the principals actually faced during the experiment. We then took
the average of the wages the principals paid to the two groups. Finally, we calculated hypothetical
payoﬀs for all three “average” players by considering the costs of the average eﬀorts.3 Results 18
sions, four reactions can be distinguished for the simulated agents. (i) For an agent
who had a higher eﬀort and a higher proﬁt, reciprocity is not violated and the pecu-
niary comparison is also advantageous for him, so he keeps his eﬀort constant. (ii)
For an agent who exerted a lower eﬀort and got a lower proﬁt, the norm of reciprocity
is satisﬁed but proﬁt maximization is not, thus he partly adjusts his eﬀort in the di-
rection of his co-worker’s eﬀort, i.e., he chooses an eﬀort (ei,t + ej,t)/2. (iii) An agent
with higher eﬀort and lower proﬁt feels exploited as he suﬀers from a disadvantageous
norm violation. Thus he adjusts his eﬀort fully and chooses ej,t. (iv) Finally, for an
agent with lower eﬀort and higher proﬁt the norm violation is advantageous, thus the
resulting utility is higher than in case (iii). He chooses an eﬀort (ei,t + ej,t)/2. The
reactions in cases (i) to (iv) are in line with the period-to-period reactions presented
in Table 4 and Figure 5.
In the simulation, we use actual eﬀort data from the experiment only for the ﬁrst
period. The subsequent eﬀort decisions are based on the simulated proﬁts and sim-
ulated eﬀorts of the previous period. The simulated principals pay the average wage
for a given eﬀort (IWT) or the average wage sum for a given eﬀort sum (EWT) as
calculated from the experimental data. Proﬁts are then calculated as wage minus cost
of eﬀort exertion. We use the same matching protocol as in the experiment.
Figure 6 shows how eﬀort choices evolve over time in the experimental data and in
the simulations. The simulations ‘EWT sim’ and ‘IWT sim’ trace the real data very
well and are able to reproduce the large eﬀort diﬀerence between treatments. In the
individual wage simulation, eﬀorts increase like the real eﬀorts although the slight
downward trend in the second half of the experiment cannot be reproduced. Eﬀorts
in the equal wage simulation constantly decrease down to an eﬀort level slightly above
3 in the ﬁnal period. This pattern is very similar to the dynamics in the real data.
We performed several robustness checks of the simulation. To check how the ﬁrst
period eﬀorts inﬂuence the result, we initialized the EWT simulation with the ﬁrst
period eﬀorts of the IWT agents and the IWT simulation with EWT-ﬁrst-period-
eﬀorts. The dynamics are very similar to the baseline speciﬁcation: in the IWT
simulation, agents steadily increase their eﬀorts while they decrease their eﬀorts in the
EWT simulation. Also other ﬁrst-period-eﬀort-vectors do not change the general result
of the simulation as long as eﬀorts are suﬃciently heterogeneous. If agents exerted the
same eﬀort already in the ﬁrst period, equal wages would not violate reciprocity and
eﬀorts would not decrease over time. The rules speciﬁed for cases (i) to (iv) do impact
the result, though not all with the same strength. While the rules for case (ii) and (iv)
can be changed without altering the qualitative result of the simulation very much, it
is crucial to keep the rules for case (i) and (iii) similar to our baseline speciﬁcation.
The treatment diﬀerence can only be reproduced in this setup if the agents revise their
eﬀort decision downwards after experiencing a disadvantageous norm violation (case3 Results 19
































Figure 6: Simulation with reciprocal agents.
Note that the pivotal agent is diﬀerent between the simulated treatments: in the equal
wage simulation the norm of reciprocity is not fulﬁlled when agents choose diﬀerent
eﬀort levels. In these cases in the simulation, the agent with the higher eﬀort will
fully adjust his eﬀort in the direction of his co-worker’s eﬀort while the co-worker will
increase his eﬀort level only to the average eﬀort of the last period. In the EWT
simulation, the average eﬀort therefore converges to the lowest ﬁrst period eﬀort as
agents are subsequently matched together: the low-eﬀort providers are pivotal. By
contrast, in the IWT the high-eﬀort providers have the decisive impact on the overall
outcome. The norm of reciprocity is mostly fulﬁlled in the IWT. Thus, the agent with
the higher eﬀort keeps his eﬀort constant while his co-worker adjusts his eﬀort. The
average eﬀort therefore converges to the highest ﬁrst period eﬀort. We will analyze
this point in more detail in the next section.
Result 6: Simple simulations based on agents who have preferences for money
and reciprocity are in line with the eﬀorts observed in the experiment and are
able to reproduce the observed treatment eﬀect.
3.4 Dynamics of high- and low-eﬀort providers
As already seen in Figure 2, subjects exhibit a substantial degree of heterogeneity with
respect to eﬀort provision. In the following, we analyze if the agents who are most or
least willing to exert eﬀort are aﬀected diﬀerently by the two payment modes at hand.
A common informal argument claims that equal wages will be especially detrimental3 Results 20
to the motivation of high performers (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts (1992), p. 419) but
clean empirical evidence is scarce. Furthermore, it is unclear how weakly motivated
agents react to equal or individual wages. We also address the question whether high
and low performers impact the overall results diﬀerently in the two treatments. The
simulations presented in the previous section suggest that this could indeed be the case:
in the EWT simulation, the low-eﬀort providers are decisive for the ﬁnal outcome while
it is the high-eﬀort providers in the IWT simulation.
To analyze these questions in the experimental data we classify agents according to
their eﬀort decision in the ﬁrst period. We deﬁne the agent with the highest ﬁrst-period
eﬀort in each matching group as “high-eﬀort provider” and the agent with the lowest
eﬀort as “low-eﬀort provider”.22 This type deﬁnition is chosen because when agents
decide on their eﬀort in the ﬁrst period, they do not have any information about the
behavior of other subjects and all learning and coordination processes occur after this
initial eﬀort choice. Thus ﬁrst-period eﬀort is likely to be a good proxy for the intrinsic
willingness of a speciﬁc agent to exert eﬀort. If some of the subjects are intrinsically
inclined to exert high eﬀorts they should show up in the group of high-eﬀort providers.
In contrast, if some of the subjects are intrinsically inclined to exert low eﬀorts they
should show up in the group of low-eﬀort providers.
In Figure 7 we follow the high-eﬀort providers and low-eﬀort providers in both treat-
ments and show their eﬀort decisions over time. In the ﬁrst period, the groups of
high-eﬀort providers and the groups of low-eﬀort providers are close together across
treatments.23 This changes completely over the course of the 12 periods. In the in-
dividual wage treatment, high-eﬀort providers continue to provide high eﬀort levels.
Low-eﬀort providers increase their eﬀorts dramatically up to the level of the high-eﬀort
providers and even higher in the last periods. In the equal wage treatment, the dynam-
ics are reversed. Here, the low-eﬀort providers keep their eﬀort provision constant and
the high-eﬀort providers reduce their eﬀorts to the level of the low-eﬀort providers.24
Put simply, the “good” agents push the “bad” agents up under individual wages while
under equal wages the “bad” ones pull the “good” ones down.
These dynamics underline the importance of the diﬀerent non-monetary incentives in-
22If more than one agent chooses the highest or lowest eﬀort in the ﬁrst period, the subsequent
eﬀort decisions of these agents are averaged.
23In the ﬁrst period, eﬀort levels are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between treatments for high-eﬀort
providers (Mann-Whitney test: p = 0.14) while they are close together but diﬀerent for the low-
eﬀort providers (Mann-Whitney test: p = 0.03). Within treatments, the high-eﬀort and low-eﬀort
providers choose statistically diﬀerent eﬀort levels in the ﬁrst period (Wilcoxon signed rank test:
p = 0.01 (IWT), p = 0.01 (EWT)).
24In the last six periods, eﬀort levels are not diﬀerent within treatments (Wilcoxon signed rank
test: p = 0.67 (IWT), p = 0.78 (EWT)) while they diﬀer between treatments (Mann-Whitney test:































Figure 7: Eﬀort decisions of high-eﬀort and low-eﬀort providers. In each matching
group, the agent with the highest (lowest) eﬀort in the ﬁrst period is deﬁned as the high
(low)-eﬀort provider.
duced by the two wage setting institutions. Remember that agents face similar mone-
tary incentives in both treatments. Wage equality often violates reciprocity. Agents in
this treatment who are in principle willing to exert high levels of eﬀort get frustrated
and lower their eﬀorts. On the contrary, under individual wages where reciprocity is
intact, good performance spreads. These results suggest that choosing a wage scheme
also inﬂuences the social dynamics between the agents.25 In our experiment, indi-
vidual wages lead to positive dynamics since agents orient themselves to the most
hard-working agents. In contrast, the equal wage scheme focuses agents’ attention on
the least motivated agents.
Result 7: The pivotal agent is diﬀerent between treatments: in the IWT the
initially low-eﬀort providers align with the high-eﬀort providers over time. In
the EWT the initially high-eﬀort providers align with the low-eﬀort providers
over time.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the interaction of reciprocity with diﬀerent wage schemes.
More speciﬁcally, we analyzed how eﬀective equal wages are in an environment where
contract enforcement solely relies on reciprocity. In our experiment, one principal is
matched with two agents. The principal pays equal wages in one treatment and can
set individual wages in the other. The use of equal wages elicits substantially lower
eﬀorts and eﬃciency in spite of similar monetary incentives for the workers under both
25See Manski (2000) for a discussion of social interaction eﬀects.4 Conclusions 22
wage schemes. In particular, exerting high eﬀort pays oﬀ in both settings. The strong
treatment diﬀerence is driven by subjects’ reciprocal preferences and the fact that
reciprocity is frequently violated in the equal wage treatment. This is not the case in
the individual wage treatment, as principals set wages mostly in line with reciprocity.
Our results have a number of implications, both for the advancement of existing theo-
ries and for the design of wage schemes in practice. First of all, it is doubtful whether
wage equality can be reconciled with the use of reciprocity to enforce incomplete con-
tracts. Our ﬁndings rather suggest that the possibility to individually sanction bad
performance and reward good performance is a crucial prerequisite to make reciprocity
the powerful enforcement device it has proven to be in many bilateral interactions. The
performance of agents in the individual wage treatment shows how eﬀective reciprocity
can be: although explicit contract enforcement is absent, 80% of the possible eﬃciency
gains are realized.
Second, while it is well-known that equal wages can distort monetary incentives, in
our experiment they are also perceived as less fair and thus eﬃciency decreasing, even
though the monetary incentives are qualitatively not aﬀected. This holds in particular
because agents diﬀer in their performance. It may thus be oversimplifying to argue
that equal wages lead to less envy and therefore higher work morale, as it is frequently
done in the political discussion.
Third, in practice the discretion to individually reciprocate good performance of sub-
ordinates does not have to be in monetary terms. Non-monetary beneﬁts like extra
vacation or awards can be useful devices to motivate workers in this context. These
instruments become especially important when it is not possible to wage discriminate
on a given hierarchical level, e.g., because the ﬁrm’s internal pay structure, agreements
with a union or legislation dictate wage equality.
The results in this paper should not be interpreted as arguments against wage equality
in general. They rather suggest that equal wages come at a cost that has to be weighed
against their potential beneﬁts. For example, equal wages are easier to implement than
individual wages, and they may encourage peer monitoring and collaboration. The rel-
ative importance of these costs and beneﬁts (and also the impact of the workforce’s
social preferences more generally) is likely to depend on the details of the institutional
setting. These include the production technology, the information structure, and the
organizational design of the ﬁrm. In this paper we presented results for one such set-
ting. Our design provides a simple and parsimonious framework that can successively
be enriched to study these aspects in future research.4 References 23
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